In April 1888, in a tempestuous finale after arriving in Turin, Friedrich Nietzsche told his friend Franz Overbeck that this was the first city that was more “a paradise for the feet” than for the eyes. In Turin, one could “walk through high archways for half hours in one breath.” It appears that Turin fulfilled hopes that Nietzsche had once harbored a good twenty years earlier. At the time, in early 1869, after completing his studies, he and his “most faithful and understanding” friend, Erwin Rohde, had planned an extended stay in Paris. Like “a couple of philosophical flaneurs,” they wanted “to walk with serious eyes and smiling lips through the stream of Paris.” Nietzsche’s appointment as professor at the Paedagogium in Basel put an end to these plans. Now,
in 1888, the city of Turin, whose boulevards, rectangular grid, passages, archways, and classical buildings constituted a number of similarities with Paris, was all the more so “a discovery of the first importance.” Turin was the first place “in which I am possible!” Nietzsche wrote in a letter to Heinrich Köselitz. “But Turin! […] This is really the city which I can now use!”

Studies of Nietzsche have thus far ignored the fact that in his final months before his breakdown, Nietzsche had transformed from a stroller in the mountainous world of the Upper Engadine into the “philosophical flaneur” of the modern metropolis that he had imagined himself to be twenty years earlier. The attraction of French culture and of Paris on Nietzsche was unbroken.

In Turin, an almost sunny, solemn relationship to the world ensued: “I feel so relaxed, so strong, so cheerful—I find myself pinning a donkey’s tail on to the most serious things.” Nietzsche wrote to Georg Brandes. The migraine headache that he had complained about for so many years had disappeared. Not a little surprised about himself, he wrote to Heinrich Köselitz on December 16, 1888: “Recently I said to myself: to have a place that one does not want to leave, not even to go into the countryside—where one is glad to walk the streets! Earlier I would have thought it impossible.”

 Whereas Nietzsche, as the hermit of Sils-Maria – as Thomas Mann called him – had found his philosophical inspirations, like Plato, walking in open nature, now in Turin he seemed to have suddenly switched to the side of Plato’s teacher, Socrates. In contrast to Plato, who had withdrawn from the city to the quiet of the olive groves, to the groves of Academe, Nietzsche wandered among the arcades of Turin in the spring of 1888, and again in the autumn of that year. As Nietzsche had noted years before in his first book The Birth of Tragedy published in 1872, Socrates’ “critical peregrinations through Athens,” the whole city, the stoa, the streets, and the agora were places to stimulate his philosophical activity. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche had felt, as if in a dream, carried back into an “ancient Greek existence”: “walking under lofty Ionic colonnades, looking up toward a horizon that was cut off by pure and noble lines, finding reflections of his transfigured shape in the shining marble at his side.”

As Giorgio Colli observed, Nietzsche cannot be understood if one strips his philosophizing of its impulse to influence life directly. The renunciation of the Will to Power project in the summer of 1888 and the resulting writings of that autumn in particular are, according to Colli, the expression of the “secret desire to intervene directly in life.” Nietzsche was, in his view, the philosopher who tried to eliminate the boundaries between philosophy, science, art, and life. His thinking always touched on and mixed with the “immediate fabric of life.”
the frenetic unrest, even euphoria of his final months, Nietzsche appears to have been no longer just philosophizing about things from a distance but wanted instead to intervene in their workings. He was longing to really grasp onto life.

It would be a mistake to characterize the months in Turin, beginning in early April 1888 and interrupted by the summer months spent in Sils-Maria, as an endpoint in Nietzsche’s intellectual life that culminated in his mad screeds and breakdown in early January 1889. His time in Turin was anything but that. On the contrary, it appears that something happened in the final months that justifies with some legitimacy seeing the Turin period not as an endpoint but rather as a turning point. This was Nietzsche’s discovery of the polis—though not in the classical, Hellenistic, political and philosophical sense. It was the discovery of the metro-polis of the late 19th century—of modernism. That which Nietzsche had previously tried to address in new constellations and experiments, but without finding an unambiguous position, now crystallized with great clarity: Nietzsche’s discovery of the city took place against the backdrop of his turn away from music as a “separate art”—of the nineteenth century—very much in the sense of Arthur Schopenhauer—and toward architecture as the “leading art” of modernism and its avant-garde. The concept of the physiology of art, which since 1886 moved more and more to the forefront of Nietzsche’s thinking, now prevailed as the foundation for what can be called Nietzsche’s turn from semiotics and abstract, philosophical concepts to corporeal phenomenology. In Turin, the seductive power of Wagner’s “German” modernism was replaced by what he had long been longing for: French modernity. Twenty years earlier after graduation, it was the French capital Paris that had attracted him so much that he had had plans to move there together with his friend Erwin Rohde—the two philosophical flaneurs. The discovery of the modern city formed the background to this triple turn from music to architecture, from the concept of The will to Power to the concept of decadence, and from abstract intellectual concepts to corporeal phenomenology. Without the discovery of the modern city, a great deal about Nietzsche’s final months would be left in the dark and his late philosophy altogether misunderstood.

1 Turn from music to architecture In 1888, the question of art grew more intense for Nietzsche. It was a time of great doubts about music, especially about the music of Richard Wagner. The Case of Wagner and Nietzsche contra Wagner were two books he dedicated to his struggle with the concept of the music of Wagner. This led to a change in the position and function of music in particular and arts in general within Nietzsche’s system of the arts. The concept of physiology came increasingly to the forefront. With the concept of physiology of arts in
focus, Nietzsche called more and more for a position of art between mind and body, between cognitive and sensory knowledge, between convictions and instincts.

Beginning in 1887, Nietzsche had repeatedly addressed the topic of physiology of arts in his unpublished works. In them he demanded of art, and especially of music, an “easing of life”; he wanted music “in which one forgets suffering; in which animal life feels idolized and triumphs.” This was still formulated very much in the spirit of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of aesthetics, but increasingly it was linked to doubts. Nietzsche’s critique was aimed at Wagner’s music having “become impossible, because he, Wagner, cannot walk, much less dance,” whereas Nietzsche called for a music “to which one wants to dance; to which perhaps, to put it cynically, one digests well.”

Immediately after formulating this, his doubt about the metaphysics of aesthetics turned into redeeming insight: “But these are physiological judgments, not aesthetic ones.” This marks the turning point in Nietzsche’s aesthetics. Only a year later in his Turin period, in connection with his “objections to the music of Wagner,” Nietzsche came to the realization that “aesthetics is nothing but a kind of applied physiology.”

It is interesting to note that in May 1888, after his first experience with Turin, Nietzsche asked the question “to what does architecture belong”? In May 1888, architecture, which had not been a subject for him previously, now moved to the focus of his philosophical interest in Turin. In The Will to Power, he had even planned a chapter titled “On the Physiology of Art,” in which he wanted to treat architecture, not music. By then architecture and not music stood paradigmatic for the concept of physiology of arts. Nietzsche intended to take a critical position against what he called the three “inartistic states,” which he characterized as “the impoverished will,” “the impoverished senses,” and “the impoverished body.” He reproached the entrenched “sign language of sounds” and hollow “theatrical rhetoric” of Wagner’s music. This lent specificity to his critique of Wagner, whom he criticized for his increasing intellectuality. In Nietzsche’s view, Wagner’s music was now characterized entirely by “scientific pleasure in artistic feats of harmonics and counterpoint.”

Nietzsche’s critique was directed at the inartistic states of “music as a separate art,” against its “emaciation, impoverishment, emptying out.” He called for what could be described as returning the arts to the everyday: the “participation of artistic abilities in normal life” and above all the restoration of the arts on a “physiological basis.” Whereas Nietzsche’s unease in the spring of 1888 was still focused on the physiological inadequacy of Wagner’s music, by the autumn of that year, he was concerned with the question of where architecture belongs, thereby putting another art ahead of music: architecture.
Nietzsche’s remarks about Turin in his letters in this period must be read in this light. “What robustness, what sidewalks, not to mention the buses and trams, the organization of which verges on the marvelous here!” He had “nowhere else taken walks with such pleasure as in these elegant, indescribably worthy streets.” In the months that followed, there was no end of praise. Beneath the “magnificent, spacious porticos, the colonnades and halls” of Turin, measuring “10,020 meters (i.e., a good two hours’ marching),” one could walk “for half hours in one breath through high archways”; and “to see the snowy Alps from the center of the city, the streets seeming to run dead-straight into them! The air dry, sublimely clear. I’d never have believed that light could make a city so beautiful.”

Nietzsche’s descriptions of Turin contradict the cliche of the philosopher who was said to have avoided cities and to have done his thinking only “on lonely mountains, [and] at the sea.” In this late stage of his intellectual life there were simply no objections against the city; it was “a magnificent and strangely soothing city,” as Nietzsche repeatedly confirmed in ever new formulations. Turin had an extremely positive influence. He wrote to Overbeck: “I am now the most grateful man in the world […]. Everything becomes easy for me. Everything works out for me.” Whereas until then illness represented “an energetic stimulus for life, for living more,” in Turin the painful suffering aspect of Nietzsche’s ritual of cognition left him.

In the spring of 1888, Nietzsche had confessed: “There’s nothing we philosophers like better than to be mistaken for artists.” At the beginning of his Turin period he still left no doubt which art he meant: music. In The Case of Wagner, he was still writing unmistakably on this subject: “Has it been noticed that music liberates the spirit? gives wings to thought? That one becomes more of a philosopher the more one becomes a musician?”

Around the time of his arrival in Turin, Nietzsche still saw philosophy and music as being in an alliance; by the end of the year, though, it was philosophy and architecture. By the time of his return from Sils-Maria that autumn, architecture, for Nietzsche, had taken the place of music.

The Mole Antonelliana in Turin played a role in this transformation that should not be ignored. The Mole Antonelliana is the tallest building in Turin even today. It was begun in 1863 as a synagogue and was originally planned to be 47 meters tall. As a result of the “absolute drive into the heights” of its architect, Alessandro Antonelli, it was completed in 1900 at a height of 168 meters. Because it lacked a clear function and typology, no name was found for it, and it continues to bear the name of its architect: the Mole Antonelliana, or “Antonelli’s massive building”. “Earlier I walked past the Mole Antonelliana, perhaps the most brilliant work of architecture ever built—strangely, it has no name—as a result of an absolute drive into the heights—it recalls nothing so much as my Zarathustra. I baptized it Ecce homo and
in that spirit placed an enormous free space around it.” Nietzsche wrote in December 30, 1888, in a draft letter to Köselitz. Nietzsche associated the building with the figure of Zarathustra and called it *Ecce homo* after the autobiographic book he had completed that autumn. Then, shortly before his breakdown on January 6, 1889, he mentioned the building again. He had attended the architect’s funeral, he noted in the postscript of a letter to Jacob Burckhardt: “I was present at the funeral of old Antonelli this November. He lived just until *Ecce homo*, the book, was finished. The book and the person as well…”

Nietzsche thus directly connected the autobiographical book he had finished that fall with the architect of the impressive building. It is interesting to note that Nietzsche had already made a similar link between the death of an artist and one of his books several years earlier. Nietzsche claimed he received the news of Wagner’s death in February 1883, just as he had completed work on *Zarathustra*. The book was “finished at precisely that holy moment when Richard Wagner died in Venice,” Nietzsche wrote. By directly relating the book *Zarathustra* to the death of Wagner and the book *Ecce homo* to the death of Antonelli, Nietzsche harnessed his own existence into a cycle of birth and rebirth. In both cases, Nietzsche saw in his books the legacy of an artist, first that of a musician – Richard Wagner – and then that of an architect – Alessandro Antonelli. *Zarathustra* and Wagner. *Ecce homo* and Antonelli. First the philosopher and the musician, then the philosopher and the architect.

2 From the Will to Power to the concept of decadence In December 1888, Nietzsche was leafing through what he called his “literature” and for the first time felt he was match for it. He wrote to Heinrich Köselitz: “the devil, what things there are in them! In Ecce Homo you will read a discovery about the third and fourth Untimely Consideration which will make your hair stand on end—mine stood on end too. […] Both these pieces have become clear to me only during the past two weeks. Signs and wonders!” In his final months in Turin, Nietzsche radically reappropriated his own intellectual biography. The prerequisite for this was the term “decadence,” which had shifted into focus for him. After rejecting the will to power, decadence became the central concept of his philosophy in this last year.

In 1886, Nietzsche had run into a definition of decadence in Paul Bourget’s *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* and had excerpted the following sentence. Bourget wrote under the headline “Théorie de la décadence”:

A decadent style is distinguished by breaking up the unity of the book in favor of the independence of the page and
by in turn breaking up the page in favor of the
independence of the sentence and the sentence in favor of
the independence of the word.\textsuperscript{1}

Nietzsche followed Bourget’s definition in so far as he rejected
Théophile Gautier’s definition of decadence as a stylistic and
formalistic phenomenon. Nietzsche, like Bourget, rejected Gautier’s
idea of the decadent and ugly, of “la laideur” or “l’horreur,” as merely
stylistic forms that produce only an effect of the new. Both saw the
phenomenon of decadence less as a stylistic, formal method than as
“stimulating qualities of the content.” It was not about decadence as an
aesthetic experience or formal practice of contrasts to the beautiful,\textsuperscript{2} but as a genuine experiential quality of modernity.

But Nietzsche followed Bourget’s definition only to a limited degree.
For him as for Bourget, literary decadence certainly meant no longer
living life in the whole. But, with far-reaching consequences for the
theory of decadence, he reversed the sequence of Bourget’s deconstructions
while adopting his metaphors almost word for word: In The Case of
Wagner, Nietzsche detailed his idea of decadence:

What is the sign of every literary decadence? That life no
longer dwells in the whole. The word becomes sovereign
and leaps out of the sentence, the sentence reaches out and
obscures the meaning of the page, the page gains life at the
expense of the whole—the whole is no longer a whole. But
this is the simile of every style of decadence: every time,
the anarchy of atoms, disintegration of the will, ‘freedom
of the individual,’ to use moral terms.\textsuperscript{3}

Until now, Nietzsche scholars have not taken notice of the fact that
Nietzsche differed from Bourget in the question of how the breakdown
of the whole should happen, how the supposed authorities—idealism
as “untruthfulness become instinctual”—could be destroyed. Whereas
Bourget saw the breakdown of the grand style of overarching unity as
descending from the overall unity to the small and the smallest, from
the book to the page, to the sentence and further on to the single word,
Nietzsche’s interest was in the opposite motion, namely, the goal of
breaking up the false authorities—that is, the grand styles—from inside
out, that is from the smallest detail outward to the largest entity, i. e.
from the single word, to the sentence, to the page and finally to the
book. The word explodes into the sentence, the sentence explodes into
the page, the page explodes into the book. This was only logical, since
breaking apart the styles, order, and systems from outside meant
replacing them with orders and systems of an even higher order and
hence giving the upper hand to superior authorities. To that end,
Nietzsche needed a reevaluation of the definition of decadence. This
lent decadence the ambiguity that made it an expression of decline and
at the same time the overcoming thereof, both a concept of truth and a
model for critique. Where the smallest explodes to become the next higher unit, decline itself has a creative, artistic potential, not just “to use moral terms.”

Nietzsche’s effort to come to terms with decadence began with his reading of Paul Bourget in 1883. But decadence only became the central concept of his philosophizing when he abandoned the large-scale work *The Will to Power*. In the latter, he had wanted to conceive the world from a single principle, but in the late summer of 1888 he had to concede his value. The will to power was replaced by decadence, but now in relation to the physiology of art itself and with reevaluating force. In 1887 the physiology of art was still positive and opposed to nihilism. Now it underwent a reevaluation as physiological degeneracy and “physiological contradictoriness.” In the spirit of the “ambiguity of values,” decadence was both a “symptom of a decline” and a life-affirming force. Thus for Nietzsche the “manifoldness and unrest” of modernity are a “symptom of decadence” and their ambiguity, the “highest form of becoming conscious.” The “corrupt and hybrid state of values corresponds to the psychological state of today’s human being; a theory of modernity.”

3 Turn from abstract intellectual concepts to corporeal phenomenology

During the miraculous convergence of his Turin period, in which Nietzsche’s body refused the habitual suffering to which it was repeatedly subjected, Nietzsche turned from music, the separate art of the nineteenth century, toward architecture as the leading art of modernity and physiological degeneracy, in what can be described as Nietzsche’s turn to corporeal phenomenology. This opened up the path to the idea of the dovetailing of architecture and the human body, which had been sketched out already much earlier in the book *The Gay Science*:

One day, and probably soon, we need some recognition of what above all is lacking in our big cities: quiet and wide, expansive places for reflection. Places with long, high-ceilinged cloisters for bad or all too sunny weather […]—buildings and sites that would altogether give expression to the sublimity of thoughtfulness and of stepping aside. […] We wish to see ourselves translated into stone and plants, we want to take walks in ourselves when we stroll around these buildings and gardens.

It remains unclear what architecture Nietzsche was thinking of when he called for a building that “would altogether give expression to the sublimity of thoughtfulness and of stepping aside,” when we have “ourselves translated into stone and plants” and want to take walks in ourselves. In Turin, Nietzsche appeared to pick up precisely that thread
when he transformed into what he had called a “philosophical flaneur” a good twenty years earlier. That failed, on the one hand, as a result of Nietzsche’s appointment as professor at the age of 24 in Basel and, on the other hand, as a result of his acquaintance with Wagner in 1868 around the time at which he graduated. At the time, Wagner was living in Tribschen, near Lucerne, and hence was easily accessible, just a few hours by train from Basel. What an extraordinary opportunity! By September 1868, Nietzsche was infected: “In Wagner […], I like […] the Faustian odor.” At their first encounter, Nietzsche had been hooked by the seductive power of Wagner, of “old Mi[ai]notaur,” the master of the labyrinth and pioneer of a specifically German, Romantic modernity. “After all, I enjoy that [Tribschen, the place where Wagner lived in exil,] more than everything, with the exception of our trip to Paris,” he had written to Rohde in the letter in which he announced he was canceling their joint trip.

Twenty years after their plans to go to Paris, Turin became the place where Nietzsche returned to his longing for the French culture. Turin was a miniature Paris, less splendid but nevertheless a former royal seat with “serious and solemn squares.” Like Paris, the city was already an important center for industry, with all the fittings of a modern metropolis, albeit on a smaller scale: a city laid out on a grid, archways, passages, and boulevards with vast prospects. With the Mole Antonelliana as a stone counterpart to the Eiffel Tower, Turin at this time was also competing directly with Paris. Nevertheless, as Nietzsche observed, quietness was “still the rule” on the streets in Turin. It sounds as if his early vision from The Gay Science had been fulfilled in the city, when he called for “quiet and wide, expansive places for reflection. Places with long, high-ceilinged cloisters.” In the arcades, the pathos-filled and introverted language of ecclesiastical spaces—that is, the vita contemplative— which here had always first been a vita religiosa, seems to have undergone a shift into the secular.

Beyond the passages and arcades, there was another architectural figure that shaped Nietzsche’s experience of the city as a cityscape: the labyrinth. This was the modern metropolis, as Walter Benjamin observed in reference to Paris as the capital of the nineteenth century, the “realization of the ancient dream of humanity, the labyrinth.” The prerequisite for perceiving the modern metropolis as a labyrinth is its rational structure. Only when the impenetrable medieval city was renovated by Baron Haussmann into the rational structure of today’s boulevards, did Paris represent the urban figure of the labyrinth, as a result of its wide, uniform, endlessly receding boulevards, its regular paving, and its neoclassical facades, because it is “only apparently homogeneous.”

Labyrinths are figures of extreme rationality, in which the path within a geometrically exact form leads into the center, offering no alternative.
Labyrinths are the opposite of chaos. They are forms of heightened rational order and, as such, the opposite of mazes. With their meandering paths, where in their countless turns one loses his orientation toward the outside, labyrinths are tropes of the intellect withdrawing into the body, of the dovetailing of myth and logic. In *Dawn*, Nietzsche had already addressed the labyrinth. Under the heading *The Hellenic Quite Unknown to Us*, he wrote:

> How simple were the people of Greece in their own conception of themselves! How far and away we surpass them in understanding human nature! And how labyrinthian as well do our souls and our conceptions of souls appear in comparison to theirs! If we [modern people] desired and dared an architecture corresponding to our own make soul (we are too cowardly for it!)—then the labyrinth would have to be our model!*

For Benjamin, the discovery of the city as labyrinth was by no means dependent on the difficulty of orienting oneself but, on the contrary, on their new, modern, clear arrangement and rationality. This called for experience:

> Not to find one’s way around a city does not mean much. But to lose one’s way in a city, as one loses one’s way in a forest, requires some schooling. Street names must speak to the urban wanderer like the snapping of dry twigs, and little streets in the heart of the city must reflect the times of day, for him, as clearly as a mountain valley.*

The city as labyrinth opens itself only to those who know how to get lost in physical contact, in perspectival views along the long sightlines of streets, in their side roads and detours, and in the deceptive shortcuts of arcades. The first prerequisite is that on long walks time is converted “into a narcotic”; only then, “with the help of these streets,” are dream images mobilized as dialectical images, and the city transforms into a text and the body into an instrument of cognition.

In order to rouse the labyrinthine character of the city, one needs corporeal phenomenological experience, but also the literary activity of the flaneur. According to Benjamin, it is the flaneur, who as pedestrian creates the city as labyrinth in the first place, “without knowing it.” This requires “schooling”; it requires the corporeal experience of the “monotonous, fascinating, constantly unrolling band of asphalt” of the metropolis. Not in medieval cities but only in the monotony of the rational structure of metropolises does the flaneur transform, with the “flexibility of the body,” the city into the labyrinth. That is why Venice, despite all its decadence, was for Nietzsche “not a city for a walker.”*

By contrast, Turin, which is the only of Italy’s historical cities that lacks a medieval old town, had the monotony of streets so important for the
flaneur, with a checkerboard system of streets and long axes that receded toward the mountains.

4 Nietzsche’s technique of the flaneur Several of Nietzsche’s notes in the autumn of 1888 can be read this way as well, as descriptions of the technique of the flaneur. In fact, Nietzsche’s notes read like instructions for the Benjaminian technique of the flaneur: “Don’t wear glasses in the street! Don’t buy books! Don’t walk into the crowd!” Then he describes one of his walks: “Evenings through the V[alentino] to the castle, then back in as far as the end of the piazza Vitt[orio Emanuele I] and to the Café Livorno.” Then again: “don’t write letters! don’t read books! take something with you to read in the café! Notebook.” Only the connection to one’s own physicality, without books and at a distance from the crowd, offers access to the subconscious. For that, the flaneur has to remain alone, in an, as Nietzsche wrote in another context, “aristocratic segregation from the masses,” whereas “the masses believe in ‘equality’ and consequently in equivalence and ‘reciprocity’” and pursue the dissolution of opposites in a false unity. The flaneur, by contrast, is interested in intensifying contradictions: “Don’t wear glasses in the street,” “Don’t walk into the crowd!” Turin was under the sign of Nietzsche’s corporeal phenomenological turn. The physiology of art is concretized in the discovery of the city as landscape.

With decadence, the physiology of art, and the discovery of architecture as the leading art of modernity, Nietzsche’s thinking during his months in Turin turned more and more to French culture and French modernity. This led to great doubts about his existence in Italy. In November 1888 he wrote, “Moral: Not Italy, old friend! […] Ideally, of course, Paris.” French culture seemed to him a “kind of prescription,” for “our bodies and souls, dear friend, a minor poisoning with Parisine is simply a ‘salvation’—we become ourselves, we stop being so stubbornly German.” Ecce homo was already, as he states, “anti-German to an annihilating extent” and consistently “side[d] with French culture.” He claimed people in Paris were saying he was “a born Parisian,” since “never before has a foreigner thought in as French a way as I did in ‘The Case [Wagner].’” In Ecce homo he said of this: “As an artist one has no home in Europe, except Paris: the délicatesse in all five artistic senses […] the fingers for nuances, the psychological morbidity [thus decadence] are found only in Paris.” Whereas in France Nietzsche was searching, Turin became for him the place of the reevaluating appropriation of his writings and of himself as “decadent,” as a Frenchman. The months in Turin were not so much the endpoint of an evolution as a turning point in the triple sense; as Nietzsche confessed in late December 1888, it was “high time that I am born again as a Frenchman.”

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Notes
1 For a detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s philosophy of architecture, see Jörg H. Gleiter, Der philosophische Planeur: Nietzsche und die Architektur (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009).
3 Nietzsche to Carl Fuchs, April 14, 1888, in Nietzsche, Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 294.
4 Nietzsche to Erwin Rohde, January 16, 1869, in Nietzsche, Briefe, 1864–69, KSB 2, 358.
6 Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz, April 20, 1888, in Middleton, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (see note 5), 295; in Nietzsche, Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 299.
7 Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz, April 7, 1888, in Middleton, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (see note 5), 291; in Nietzsche, Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 285.
9 Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz, December 16, 1888, in Middleton, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (see note 5), 335; in Nietzsche, Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 529.
11 Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy (see note 10), sec. 25, 144; Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie (see note 10), sec. 25, 115.
12 Giorgio Colli, “Nachwort,” in KSA 6, 450.
15 Nietzsche, Nachlass, 1885–87, KSA 12, 7[7], 285.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
19 Nietzsche, Nachlass, 1887–89, KSA 13, 17[9], 529.
20 Ibid., 530.
22 Nietzsche, The Case of Wagner (see note 21), esp. sec. 7, 170; Nietzsche, Der Fall Wagner (see note 21), sec. 8, 30.
24 Nietzsche, Nachlass, 1887–89, KSA 13, 17[9], 530.
25 Ibid.
27 Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz, April 7, 1888, in Middleton, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (see note 5), 291; in Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 285.
28 Nietzsche to Franziska Nietzsche, April 20, 1888, in Nietzsche, Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 302.
29 Ibid., 301.
30 Nietzsche to Carl Fuchs April 14, 1888, in Fuss and Shapiro, Nietzsche (see note 9), 116; in Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 294.
32 Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz, October 14, 1888, in Middleton, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (see note 5), 313; in Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 451.
33 Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck, October 18, 1888, in Middleton, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (see note 5), 315; in Briefe, 1887–89, KSB 8, 453.
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